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405 
Note 
Preparation to Infringe after MedImmune v. 
Genentech: Why the Federal Circuit’s Declaratory 
Judgment Jurisdiction Test is Still Too Stringent 
Hugh D. Brown* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
MedImmune v. Genentech1 significantly lowered the bar for 
patent declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Before MedImmune, 
the Federal Circuit’s two-pronged reasonable apprehension of 
suit test2 required a plaintiff (1) to have a reasonable basis for 
believing that it would be sued for infringement by a patentee, 
and (2) to have engaged in meaningful preparation to infringe. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling removed the test’s first prong, 
requiring a potential infringer to actually anticipate a suit for 
infringement.3 The case did not explicitly address the second 
prong of the test, which required declaratory judgment 
plaintiffs to show that their infringing products were at an 
advanced stage of development. 
This Note argues that the Federal Circuit should lower the 
bar on the second prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit 
test, granting declaratory judgment jurisdiction on a lower 
showing of preparation to infringe. Section II describes the 
background to MedImmune, beginning with the Federal 
                                                          
 2010 Hugh D. Brown. 
* Hugh D. Brown is a J.D. candidate at the University of Minnesota Law 
School. He would like to thank his family. 
 1. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 2. See Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004), 
overruled by MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 133. 
 3. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11. 
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Circuit’s reasonable apprehension of suit test. It then describes 
the MedImmune holding and the subsequent effect of the 
holding on Federal Circuit approaches to subject matter 
jurisdiction. Section III analyzes these effects in light of 
MedImmune and the purposes of the Declaratory Judgment 
Act4 itself. Based on the purposes behind the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, the influence of MedImmune, and good policy, 
this note concludes that the Federal Circuit’s test is still too 
stringent and declaratory judgment plaintiffs ought to be able 
to sue to ascertain their rights in a broader range of 
circumstances. 
II.  THE IMPACT OF MEDIMMUNE ON DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT JURISDICTION 
A.  THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT AND STANDING 
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution 
provides that the judicial power of the United States extends to 
cases and controversies.5 This provision prohibits federal courts 
from issuing advisory opinions or opinions on hypothetical 
facts.6 Therefore, for a plaintiff to have standing, he must 
allege an actual injury which is “fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be 
redressed by the requested relief,”7 rather than a hypothetical 
future injury. Where the injury alleged is a prohibition on 
allegedly legal activity, such as an invalid patent or an 
unconstitutional law, this language presents litigants with an 
unpleasant choice: they can obey the unlawful prohibition and 
refrain from allegedly lawful behavior, in which case they 
would lack the injury necessary to avail themselves of relief in 
an Article III court, or they could disobey the prohibition and 
risk the consequences if the prohibition was later found to be 
lawful. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act was designed to ameliorate 
the effects of this doctrine.8 It provides: 
                                                          
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also  U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. 
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 446 (1993). 
 6. U.S. Nat’l Bank, 508 U.S. at 446. 
 7. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 8. See Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274, 288–90 (1928), 
superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as recognized in Calderon v. Ashmus, 
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In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of 
the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may 
declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be 
sought.9 
Therefore, the Declaratory Judgment Act allows the courts 
to hear cases involving injuries which are merely threatened, 
rather than actually inflicted. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act is particularly important 
for patent law. Patent infringement carries the threat of 
liability for treble damages.10 Without the ability to sue for a 
declaratory judgment, a potential infringer has no choice but to 
lose a business opportunity or indefinitely accrue potential 
liability for infringement in the course of that opportunity. This 
uncertainty allows patentees to put heavy pressure on potential 
infringers to pay license fees even in cases where a patentee 
has a questionable claim. The Federal Circuit described the 
resulting situation as a “danse macabre” where the patentee 
brandished a “Damoclean threat with a sheathed sword”: 
Guerrilla-like, the patent owner attempts extra-judicial patent 
enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics that infect the 
competitive environment of the business community with uncertainty 
and insecurity. Before the Act, competitors victimized by that tactic 
were rendered helpless and immobile so long as the patent owner 
refused to grasp the nettle and sue. After the Act, those competitors 
were no longer restricted to an in terrorem choice between the 
incurrence of a growing potential liability for patent infringement and 
abandonment of their enterprises; they could clear the air by suing for 
a judgment that would settle the conflict of interests.11 
Declaratory judgment removes this threat where there is a 
conflict between the patentee’s patent and the potential 
infringer’s product. 
The Declaratory Judgment Act is a procedural tool, 
however, and only extends as far as the Constitution permits.12 
A case or controversy must still exist.13 As Aetna v. Haworth 
pointed out, Congress may provide for new procedures for the 
                                                          
523 U.S. 740, 745 (1998). 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also  Biacore, AB v. Thermo Bioanalysis 
Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 422, 471 (D. Del. 1999). 
 11. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolchem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (internal citations removed). 
 12. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937). 
 13. Id. 
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adjudication and enforcement of rights, but it may not expand 
those rights beyond the limits of Article III.14 The 
constitutional requirements for declaratory judgment, 
therefore, are the same as those for standing in general.15 
There must be a controversy that is appropriate for judicial 
determination, i.e. not “academic or moot.”16 The dispute must 
be “definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties 
having adverse legal interests.”17 
B.  FEDERAL CIRCUIT JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINE 
Article III limits the situations in which a potential 
infringer may challenge the validity of a patent via declaratory 
judgment. The Federal Circuit has developed a doctrine to 
determine when declaratory judgment jurisdiction exists for 
patent cases. Prior to MedImmune, the test, known as the 
reasonable apprehension of suit test, was two-pronged.18 The 
Federal Circuit first applied this test in Arrowhead Industrial 
Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc.19 First, the patentee must have 
given some indication to the potential infringer that the 
patentee would sue if the potentially infringing behavior 
continued.20 Second, the potential infringer must have 
produced or prepared to produce the potentially infringing 
product.21 
Most of the litigation in these cases has focused on the first 
prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test, which 
regulates the actions of the patentee. However, the Federal 
Circuit has also mentioned the second prong in depth in, for 
example, Sierra Applied Sciences, Inc. v. Advanced Energy 
Industries, Inc.22 In Sierra, the court consolidated the current 
language of “immediacy and reality” by focusing on its 
precedents in Lang v. Pacific Marine and Supply Co.23 and 
                                                          
 14. Id. at 240. 
 15. See id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 240–41. 
 18. BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 
1993). 
 19. 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 363 F.3d 1361, 1378–80 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 23. 895 F.2d 761 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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Teletronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.24 
In Lang we held that that immediacy was absent where the ship at 
issue would not be ready for at least nine months and the owners of 
the ship had not engaged in any marketing activities. 
 
Teletronics implicitly tied the concept of “reality” to whether the 
design of the potentially infringing subject of the declaratory-
judgment suit was substantially fixed, particularly with respect to its 
potentially-infringing characteristics, on the date the complaint was 
filed.25 
The Federal Circuit justified its approach by pointing out 
that variability in a potentially infringing product increased 
the chance that the product would change before release, 
rendering the opinion on the previous version purely advisory, 
in violation of Article III.26 Because of this concern, the Federal 
Circuit has tended to require a high degree of product 
development before granting jurisdiction where the second 
prong is in issue. In Lang, the court held that jurisdictional 
immediacy requirements were not fulfilled when the 
“infringing ship’s hull was still nine months from completion 
when the complaint was filed.”27 There was no indication that 
the design of the hull was susceptible to change or that the hull 
might not be finished. Yet the plaintiff was refused the chance 
to gain a determination of his rights before expending the 
resources necessary to complete the ship. Lang demonstrates 
the high degree of development the Federal Circuit requires 
before granting jurisdiction. 
In several other cases, district courts, following the Federal 
Circuit’s lead, denied declaratory judgment jurisdiction in 
situations where potential infringers had incurred considerable 
cost in preparation of potentially infringing products. In Duhn 
Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp.,28 the court refused 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction to an alleged infringer whose 
product was still at the design stage.29 The court stated, 
“Cameron asks the Court to determine that Cameron’s Patent 
Pending Design, whether in practice, or in theory, does not 
                                                          
 24. 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 25. Sierra, 363 F.3d at 1379. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Lang, 895 F.2d at 765. 
 28. No. 1:05-cv-01411-OWW-GSA, 2007 WL 3335008 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 
2007). 
 29. Id. at *7. 
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infringe Duhn’s ‘925 Patent. . . . No infringement is alleged. As 
yet, no adverse legal relationship exists.”30 Partially on this 
basis,31 the court refused to grant declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction, and the plaintiff was unable to determine whether 
its new design infringed an existing patent before proceeding to 
manufacture. 
In Shaunnessey v. Monteris Medical, Inc.,32 the court held 
that a potential infringer who had not yet obtained approval on 
its medical device was not entitled to declaratory judgment 
since it was unclear whether the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) would require design change.33 The 
potential infringer was several years away from submitting the 
device for FDA approval, however, and significant costs had 
been incurred in the development of the product.34 
In Mega Lift Systems, LLC v. MGM Well Services, Inc.,35 
the court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s declaratory judgment suit where the plaintiff had 
substantially completed the design of the product, but had not 
yet finalized the design or begun to manufacture or sell the 
product. The court stated, “Under these facts, the Court cannot 
determine whether Mega Lift is ready to infringe tomorrow or 
next year.”36 The court decided that, under these 
circumstances, the dispute was neither “immediate” nor 
“real.”37 These cases demonstrate that in a large number of 
cases, both before and after MedImmune, district courts have 
adopted a restrictive approach to declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction. 
C.  THE EFFECT OF MEDIMMUNE. 
MedImmune, decided January 9, 2007, lowered the bar 
established by the reasonable apprehension of suit test. 
MedImmune, manufacturer of Synagis, “a drug designed to 
prevent respiratory tract disease in young children,” entered 
                                                          
 30. Id. at *6. 
 31. The court also cited the fact that the USPTO had the power to alter 
the design, and, therefore, it was not necessarily fixed. Id. 
 32. 554 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (M.D. Fla. 2008). 
 33. Id. at 1324. 
 34. See id. 
 35. No. 6:08 CV 420, 2009 WL 1851919 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 29, 2009). 
 36. Id. at *4. 
 37. Id. 
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into a license agreement with Genentech, paying royalties to 
produce products covered by an existing patent and a pending 
patent.38 MedImmune agreed to pay royalties on sales of 
“licensed products” in exchange for the right to make, use, and 
sell them.39 In 2001, the pending patent matured, and 
Genentech sent a letter to MedImmune expressing its belief 
that Synagis was covered by the patent and requesting 
royalties under the license agreement.40 MedImmune 
disagreed, but given the potential liability for treble damages 
and attorney’s fees, as well as  for an injunction against selling 
Synagis (which had accounted for 80% of MedImmune’s 
revenue since 1999), MedImmune decided to pay under 
protest.41 MedImmune filed suit seeking a declaratory 
judgment of noninfringement of Genentech’s patent or 
invalidity of the patent.42 The district court granted 
Genentech’s motion to dismiss, and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, reasoning that the license agreement had 
“obliterate[d] any reasonable apprehension that [MedImmune] 
will be sued for infringement.”43 
The Supreme Court reversed. It held that MedImmune was 
“not required, insofar as Article III [was] concerned, to break or 
terminate its 1997 license agreement before seeking a 
declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying 
patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.”44 The Court 
reviewed the history of the Declaratory Judgment Act in the 
context of its Article III roots.45 The Court stated that the Act 
required a dispute that is “definite and concrete, touching the 
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests; and 
that [is] real and substantial, and admit[s] of specific relief 
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished 
from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a 
hypothetical state of facts.”46 The fact that MedImmune’s own 
                                                          
 38. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 121 (2007). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 122. 
 42. Id. at 123. 
 43. Id. at 122. 
 44. Id. at 137. 
 45. Id. at 120. 
 46. Id. at 127 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–
41 (1937)). 
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actions eliminated the imminent threat of harm was 
irrelevant—the conflict was still real, and the fact that 
MedImmune was paying royalties was injury enough to provide 
a basis for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.47 Arguably the 
most important part of the MedImmune opinion came in a 
footnote, which explained that the Federal Circuit’s reasonable 
apprehension of suit test was inconsistent with a previous 
Supreme Court case: 
[Altvater]48 . . . contradict[s] the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable 
apprehension of suit” test . . . . The reasonable-apprehension-of-suit 
test also conflicts with our decisions in Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., . . . where jurisdiction obtained even though 
the collision-victim defendant could not have sued the declaratory-
judgment plaintiff-insurer without first obtaining a judgment against 
the insured. . . .49 
The Federal Circuit took the Supreme Court at its word 
and altered the reasonable apprehension of suit test in 
subsequent cases. The first prong was altered quickly. In 
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectonics Inc., the Federal Circuit 
recognized that MedImmune represented a rejection of the 
reasonable apprehension of suit test, and adopted the 
proposition that “Article III jurisdiction may be met where the 
patentee takes a position that puts the declaratory judgment 
plaintiff in the position of either pursuing arguably illegal 
behavior or abandoning that which he claims a right to do.”50 
The court declined to “define the outer boundaries” of 
                                                          
 47. Id. at 123. 
 48. The Court described the Altvater opinion in more depth: 
Altvater v. Freeman [319 U.S. 359 (1943)] held that a licensee’s failure to 
cease payment did not render non-justiciable a dispute over the validity of 
the patent. . . . “The fact that royalties were being paid did not make this 
a ‘difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character.’” The 
royalties “were being paid under protest and under the compulsion of an 
injunction decree,” and “[u]nless the injunction decree were modified, the 
only other course [of action] was to defy it, and to risk not only actual but 
treble damages in infringement suits. [T]he requirements of [a] case or 
controversy are met where payment of a claim is demanded as of right 
and where payment is made, but where the involuntary or coercive nature 
of the exaction preserves the right to recover the sums paid or to 
challenge the legality of the claim.” 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 130–31 (2007). 
 49. Id. at 132–33 n.11. 
 50. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
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jurisdiction over declaratory judgment claims.51 SanDisk was a 
start, but left lower courts without much guidance. Four days 
later in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis 
Pharmaceuticals Corp., the Federal Circuit suggested that an 
“all the circumstances” test was the appropriate test for 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.52 Noting that an Article III 
controversy could be found where the plaintiff had 
demonstrated an injury in fact that could be redressed in court, 
the court held that the same standard applied in a declaratory 
judgment suit, and reversed the dismissal of the suit for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.53 The case was an easy one, 
however, and the court would probably have reached the same 
result under its reasonable apprehension test prior to 
MedImmune.54 The case established the importance of the 
Article III language. In subsequent cases, the court seems to 
have settled on a ‘standing-lite’ test, the court’s new relaxed 
standing requirement, which grants standing when the injury 
suffered by the plaintiff meets the test of “immediacy and 
reality”:55 
This “immediacy and reality” inquiry can be viewed through the lens 
of standing. To satisfy standing, the plaintiff must allege (1) an 
injury-in-fact, i.e., a harm that is “‘concrete’ and actual or imminent, 
not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” (2) that is “fairly traceable” to the 
defendant’s conduct, and (3) redressable by a favorable decision.56 
MedImmune’s impact on the second prong of the 
reasonable apprehension of suit was less obvious. The Supreme 
Court had not explicitly indicated its disapproval, as it had 
with the first prong.57 The Court’s indication that declaratory 
judgment ought to be available in a wider range of 
circumstances, however, was taken as a suggestion that the bar 
for fulfilling the second prong should be lowered too, 
                                                          
 51. Id. 
 52. 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 53. Id. at 1345–46. 
 54. Teva Pharmaceuticals had already produced and marketed the 
potentially infringing product, and Novartis had brought an infringement suit 
against Teva on related products. Id. at 1334–35. 
 55. Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 56. Id. 
 57. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132–33 n.11 
(2007). 
BROWN LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:08 AM 
414 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 11:1 
 
 
particularly in Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.,58 the 
first case to deal with the second prong. In Benitec, Nucleonics 
sued for a judgment of invalidity of Benitec’s patent.59 The 
Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
declaratory judgment action on the basis that Nucleonics had 
“failed to show that its future plans meet the immediacy and 
reality . . . necessary to support a justiciable controversy.”60 
First, Nucleonics had only talked with potential customers and 
executed a confidentiality agreement.61 The court stated that 
“to allow such a scant showing . . . would be to allow nearly 
anyone who so desired to challenge a patent.”62 Second, 
“Nucleonics had provided insufficient information for a court to 
assess whether Nucleonics’s future animal work would be 
infringing or not.”63 Third, the patentee had decided in the 
interim that the technology did not in fact infringe the patent.64 
The first and second rationales were the most important. The 
court recognized the overruling of the reasonable apprehension 
of suit test, and used the SanDisk test, stating that “Article III 
jurisdiction may be met where the patentee takes a position 
that puts the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the position of 
either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that 
which he claims a right to do.”65 The court also used the 
“immediacy and reality” language of Sierra, applying it for the 
first time to a case where the party whose inaction deprived the 
court of jurisdiction was the plaintiff, not the defendant.66 This 
touched on the second prong of the reasonable apprehension of 
suit test and suggested that MedImmune might have affected 
this aspect of declaratory judgment jurisdiction too. 
The Federal Circuit more explicitly explored the second 
prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test in Cat Tech 
                                                          
 58. 495 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 59. Id. at 1342. The court’s opinion does not give sufficient information to 
determine how far Nucleonics had progressed with its potentially infringing 
products. 
 60. Id. at 1348–49. 
 61. Id. at 1349. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 1344 (quoting SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 
F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 66. Id. at 1348 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 
127 (2007)). 
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LLC v. TubeMaster. Noting that it had yet to consider the effect 
of MedImmune on the second prong,67 the court stated: 
[A]lthough MedImmune articulated a “more lenient legal standard” 
for the availability of declaratory relief in patent cases the issue of 
whether there has been meaningful preparation to conduct 
potentially infringing activity remains an important element in the 
totality of circumstances which must be considered in determining 
whether a declaratory judgment is appropriate.68 
Following Benitec, the court decided that the immediacy 
and reality tests were appropriate for the second prong.69 
Analyzing “immediacy,” it found that “[c]onstitutionally 
mandated immediacy requirements have been satisfied because 
once the threat of liability . . . has been lifted, it appears likely 
that TubeMaster can . . . solicit and fill orders.”70 Analyzing 
“reality,” it found that the potentially infringing product was 
“substantially fixed,” and that “TubeMaster does not expect to 
make substantial modifications.”71 Therefore, the dispute was 
“real.”72 Cat Tech was ambiguous on the effect of MedImmune 
on the second prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test. 
While the court did not rule out the possibility that 
MedImmune was a factor, Cat Tech would most likely have 
been decided as it was regardless of MedImmune.73 
A recent Colorado district court decision provides more 
guidance on the effect of MedImmune on the second prong. In 
                                                          
 67. Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, 528 F.3d 871, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The 
court acknowledged that it had addressed the actions of a potential infringer 
in Benitec, but maintained that it had not directly addressed the “continued 
viability of the second prong of this court’s pre-MedImmune test.” Id. at 880 
n.3. 
 68. Id. (citations omitted). 
 69. Id. at 880 (“If a declaratory judgment plaintiff has not taken 
significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity, the dispute is neither 
‘immediate’ nor ‘real’ and the requirements for justiciability have not been 
met.”) (citing Lang v. Pac. Marine and Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir. 
1990)). 
 70. Id. at 882. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. The court compared the stage of development to the technology in 
Sierra, decided prior to MedImmune, and decided on that basis that the 
technology in Cat Tech was sufficiently advanced to merit jurisdiction. Id. at 
882–83 (“Unlike the technology involved in . . . Sierra . . . TubeMaster’s 
technology is ‘substantially fixed’. . . . The dispute with Cat Tech is ‘real,’ not 
hypothetical, because it appears likely that, once the cloud of liability for 
infringement is eliminated, the accused products can be produced without 
significant design change.”). 
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City of Aurora, Colo.  v. PS Systems,74 the court held that cases 
decided prior to MedImmune were no longer valid on the second 
prong of the reasonable apprehension test.75 As this case and 
others show, the effect of MedImmune on the requirement of 
preparation to infringe is still an open question. 
III.  THE BAR TO DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
JURISDICTION IS STILL TOO HIGH. 
A.  CRITICISM OF THE REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF SUIT TEST 
PRE-MEDIMMUNE 
Before MedImmune, the Federal Circuit’s approach had 
been criticized on several grounds. First, the test was applied 
with unreasonable formalism.76 The Federal Circuit has too 
often applied the letter of the reasonable apprehension of suit 
test, with too little consideration for its normative purposes. In 
Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., for example, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the 12(b)(1) dismissal of a declaratory judgment suit 
against Amoco.77  Shell initiated licensing discussions when 
deciding whether to pursue a course of conduct which might 
arguably have fallen under Amoco’s patent.78 When the 
discussions broke down, Amoco suggested that Shell consider a 
declaratory judgment action.79 However, Amoco filed a 12(b)(1) 
motion in response to the action when it was filed.80 Despite the 
breakdown of the licensing discussions, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s grant of the motion on the basis that 
“Amoco might never have sued, either because the validity of 
its patent was doubtful or its infringement argument was too 
weak.”81 The conflict in Shell Oil was real enough for the 
parties to begin licensing discussions and abandon them on the 
basis of inability to agree over their rights regarding a certain 
                                                          
 74. No. 07-CV-02371-WYD-BNB, 2008 WL 4377505 (D. Colo. 2008). 
 75. Id. at *10 (“Finally, I note that those cases were decided under the 
‘reasonable apprehension’ test which appears to be no longer valid in light of 
the more lenient standard articulated in MedImmune.”). 
 76. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, Re-evalutaing Declaratory Judgment 
Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957, 979 (2008). 
 77. 970 F.2d 885, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoted in de Larena, supra note 
76, at 979). 
 78. Id. at 886. 
 79. Id. at 887. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 889 (emphasis added). 
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patent. Despite this clearly concrete legal dispute between the 
parties, which would have been solved by a judgment on the 
merits, the Federal Circuit denied jurisdiction by a rigid 
application of the reasonable apprehension of suit test.82 
Second, the test has been inconsistent. Before 
MedImmune, the Federal Circuit usually used the reasonable 
apprehension of suit test. However, it has also used a “totality 
of the circumstances” test.83 Accordingly, “[the Federal Circuit 
applied] the standard(s) formalistically, but at the same time 
mix[ed] in other tests and versions without clearly articulating 
or applying a single test that would settle the reasonable 
expectations of parties. Unfortunately, this goes against the 
normative values of consistency and reliability of 
jurisprudence.”84 Also, more importantly, the court used its test 
to block parties like Shell from settling their rights and 
responsibilities vis-à-vis potentially infringed patents. 
B.  THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS POST-MEDIMMUNE. 
The court’s analysis in Cat Tech was much more similar to 
its pre-MedImmune analysis in Sierra than it was different. 
Sierra focused on immediacy and reality, and suggested that 
the plaintiff’s infringing conduct must not be forthcoming too 
far in the future,85 and must not be susceptible to much change 
before taking its final form.86 Cat Tech had similar 
requirements. It required that a plaintiff have taken 
significant, concrete steps to conduct infringing activity, and it 
also required immediacy.87 While there was language that 
suggested that the court might be open to an easier standard,88 
no such standard was explicitly articulated. 
Such an adherence to the old standard is inappropriate for 
many reasons. First, the unreasonably high bar is contrary to 
                                                          
 82. See id. 
 83. de Larena, supra note 76, at 977–78. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Sierra Applied Sci., Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., 363 F.3d 
1361, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 86. Id. at 1379. 
 87. Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 881–82 (Fed. Cir. 
2008). 
 88. “[A]lthough a party need not have engaged in the actual manufacture 
or sale of a potentially infringing product to obtain a declaratory judgment of 
non-infringement, there must be a showing of ‘meaningful preparation.’” Id. at 
881. 
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the spirit, if not the explicit language, of MedImmune. Second, 
it is also contrary to the traditional standing doctrine which 
forms the basis for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.89 Finally, 
good policy suggests that the bar should be lower. 
MedImmune only explicitly challenged the first prong of 
the reasonable apprehension of suit test.90 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in the circumstances, however, supports 
lowering the bar for the second prong, too. The MedImmune 
plaintiff’s own actions (i.e., complying with his license 
agreement) rendered suit against him impossible. Despite this, 
the Court allowed him to seek a declaration of his rights before 
he risked such a suit by taking the action which would have 
allowed the suit to proceed. In other words, the Court did not 
force the plaintiff to subject himself to the possibility of suit 
before it allowed him to sue for a declaration of his rights.91 
Declaratory judgment plaintiffs whose suits are dismissed 
under the immediacy and reality requirements contained in the 
second prong of the reasonable apprehension of suit test92 have 
a similar quandary, and so they seek a declaration of their 
rights before their product reaches a point of development 
where they may be sued for infringement. The MedImmune 
Court stated strongly that this should be allowed: “There is no 
dispute that [the declaratory judgment requirements] would 
have been satisfied if petitioner had taken the final step of 
refusing to make royalty payments [and thereby subjecting 
himself to suit].”93 The plaintiff’s failure to subject himself to 
suit did not defeat this exercise of jurisdiction. Where an action 
of the plaintiff was the only thing preventing the suit for 
infringement, the Supreme Court stated “[W]e do not require a 
                                                          
 89. See supra notes 1011 and accompanying text. 
 90. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n.11 (2007) 
(“Altvater . . . contradict[s] the Federal Circuit’s ‘reasonable apprehension of 
suit’ test.”). 
 91. The Supreme Court, of course, did not analyze this point under the 
reasonable apprehension of suit test. However, it allowed jurisdiction even 
when the plaintiff had not taken action to reach the point where it was 
infringing a patent. 
 92. See, e.g., Shaunnessey v. Monteris Med., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1321 
(M.D. Fla. 2008) (dismissing patentee’s declaratory judgment action for lack of 
immediacy and ruling that where defendant had not yet obtained approval on 
its class III medical device, the “immediacy” requirement of an actual 
controversy was not satisfied, since it was speculative as to whether the FDA 
would require design changes). 
 93. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 128. 
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plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to 
challenge the basis for the threat.”94 However, this is exactly 
what the Federal Circuit requires when it forces a potential 
infringer to develop a product to the point where he may be 
sued before it allows a court to declare his rights vis-à-vis the 
patent. MedImmune allows a plaintiff to be sure of his rights 
before subjecting himself to suit. It should make no difference 
whether he is protected from suit by payment of license fees or 
by a product which has not yet reached the point where an 
infringement suit may be brought. Article III standing 
requirements, rather than those imposed by the Federal 
Circuit’s patent declaratory judgment jurisdiction, ought to be 
the only requirements. 
The language used in MedImmune supports this 
conclusion. The Supreme Court describes declaratory judgment 
in terms of traditional standing doctrine, rather than 
traditional Federal Circuit patent analysis.95 It reiterates that 
“the phrase ‘case of actual controversy’ in the Act refers to the 
type of ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are justiciable under 
Article III.”96 While the Supreme Court does use a patent case 
(Altvater) to demonstrate the final proposition, the cases that 
lead up to this proposition are not patent cases. This suggests 
that the Supreme Court is promulgating a patent declaratory 
judgment standard that more closely follows traditional 
standing doctrine than the Federal Circuit has been doing so 
far. 
MedImmune’s implicit suggestion that the Federal Circuit 
should follow Article III’s standing doctrine more closely is 
welcome, but the reminder should not have been necessary. 
Patent rights have historically been problematic and 
uncertainty surrounding them was an issue even in 1934.97 The 
Declaratory Judgment Act was partially intended to alleviate 
this uncertainty.98 The Supreme Court had repeatedly decided 
                                                          
 94. Id. at 128–29. While the court was referring to government 
enforcement, it is clear that this was the relevant question regardless of where 
the threat of force came from. 
 95. Id. at 127. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See supra notes 1011 and accompanying text. 
 98. Lisa A. Dolak, Power or Prudence: Toward a Better Standard for 
Evaluating Patent Litigants’ Access to the Declaratory Judgment Remedy, 41 
U.S.F. L. REV. 407, 408 n.6 (2007). Dolak discusses congressional hearings on 
previous declaratory judgment bills. Bills were intended to remove 
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that the Declaratory Judgment Act should be interpreted to 
grant jurisdiction to the extent allowed by the Constitution.99 
This suggests that the requirements for declaratory judgment 
jurisdiction in patent cases should parallel the requirements for 
Article III standing. 
C.  THE JURISDICTIONAL GAP 
Exactly how wide is the gap between Federal Circuit 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, and traditional Article III 
standing doctrine as applied to declaratory judgment actions in 
general? Aetna’s formulation of the declaratory judgment 
standard is difficult to apply in a concrete and consistent 
manner.100 Rather, the Supreme Court has stated that whether 
specific facts constitute an actual controversy must be 
determined on a case by case basis.101 Therefore it is impossible 
to draw a bright line distinction between the practices of the 
Federal Circuit in patent cases and courts who interpret Article 
III standing in other kinds of cases. It is possible, however, to 
show some general distinctions. 
First, the Constitution does not mandate the reasonable 
apprehension of suit test.102 “The Federal Circuit has 
                                                          
uncertainty, and patents were explicitly referred to in Senate testimony 
regarding a previous bill: 
In his senate testimony, Professor Sunderland described the plight of 
the alleged patent infringer, as follows: I assert that I have a right to 
use a certain patent. You claim that you have a patent. What am I 
going to do about it? There is no way I can litigate my right, which I 
claim, to use that device, except by going ahead and using it, and you 
[the patent holder] can sit back as long as you please and let me run 
up just as high a bill of damages as you wish to have me run up, and 
then you may sue me for the damages, and I am ruined, having acted 
all the time in good faith and on my best judgment, but having no 
way in the world to find out whether I had a right to use that device 
or not. 
Id. (quoting 1928 Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 34–35 (1928) (testimony of Professor 
Edson R. Sunderland)). 
 99. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 126 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 
300 U.S. 227 (1937)). 
 100. McCahill v. Borough of Fox Chapel, 438 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1971) 
(“The considerations, while catholic, are not concrete.”). 
 101. Simmonds Aerocessories, Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America, 
257 F.2d 485, 489 (3d Cir. 1958) (“Whether there is an actual controversy 
within the meaning of the Act is a question which turns on the facts of each 
individual case.”). 
 102. Dolak, supra note 98, at 421. 
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recognized that the Act’s actual controversy requirement is 
constitutionally mandated and that the Act neither confers 
jurisdiction on the federal courts nor imposes jurisdictional 
requirements above and beyond those compelled by the 
Constitution.”103 As Dolak also points out, however, the Federal 
Circuit has repeatedly used its reasonable apprehension of suit 
test to determine whether an actual controversy exists, “thus 
effectively equating its test with the constitutional minimum 
requirements.”104 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that 
many Federal Circuit members have disclaimed the 
jurisdictional underpinning of the reasonable apprehension of 
suit test.105 Judge Gajarsa wrote: “Article III does not compel 
[the reasonable apprehension test].”106 
Second, the reasonable apprehension of suit test confuses 
the jurisdictional and discretionary prongs of declaratory 
judgment.107 The Federal Circuit has recognized that there is a 
discretionary element to the declaratory judgment 
jurisdictional question.108 Much more frequently, however, it 
has taken policy considerations into account when deciding the 
jurisdictional elements of declaratory judgment, rather than 
the discretionary element. As Dolak says: 
[T]he problem is not that the Federal Circuit has taken policy into 
account in evaluating declaratory judgment justiciability. The 
problem is the extent to which it has permitted policy to influence the 
first step—the constitutional or jurisdictional analysis—as evidenced 
by its justifications for, and application of, its two-step reasonable 
apprehension/infringer activity test.109 
Dolak also points out several instances in which the court 
has “unequivocally linked its test to both the language of the 
Act and to the applicable constitutional constraints.”110 In Teva, 
the court stated: 
In order for this case to be one fit for judicial review, Teva must be 
able to demonstrate that it has a reasonable apprehension of 
                                                          
 103. Id. at 420 (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. at 421. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. at 422. 
 108. Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 883 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“Even assuming that the immediacy and reality prerequisites for declaratory 
judgment relief have been met, the district court’s exercise of its declaratory 
judgment authority is discretionary.”). 
 109. Dolak, supra note 98, at 425. 
 110. Id. at 423. 
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imminent suit. Whether there is an “actual controversy” between 
parties having adverse legal interests depends upon whether the facts 
alleged show that there is a substantial controversy between the 
parties of “sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of 
a declaratory judgment.” This requirement of imminence reflects the 
Article III mandate that the injury in fact be “concrete,” and “actual 
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” . . . We do not think that 
the cases cited by Teva support the proposition that the reasonable 
apprehension of suit prong of our traditional two-part test is not a 
constitutional requirement.111 
Such conflation of jurisdictional and prudential 
considerations has developed a test that has been applied 
under the assumption that it is mandated by the Constitution. 
Not only has the test achieved quasi-constitutional force, it has 
become unnecessarily strict by formulating it not just on the 
basis of Article III, but also on the basis of every possible policy 
argument which can be made against easy declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction.112 While making decisions on the basis of 
these policy considerations is appropriate in some cases, it is 
not appropriate in every case.113 This conflation of policy and 
jurisdiction arguments has not only resulted in an 
unnecessarily high bar to declaratory judgment for potential 
infringers, it has also made this high bar more difficult to 
overcome with jurisdictional arguments. If the discretionary 
prong is separated from the jurisdictional prong, plaintiffs can 
respond to each with appropriate arguments. As it is, the 
waters have been muddied. Conflation of the prudential and 
                                                          
 111. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333–35 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (second emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 112. The three arguments Dolak raises in favor of a narrow declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction standard are (1) respect for the patent system, (2) 
encouragement to design around patents, (3) encouragement to negotiate. See 
Dolak, supra note 98, at 434–35 (“[R]eadily subjecting patents to declaratory 
judgment attack would tend to undermine the respect Congress created the 
Federal Circuit to engender, for litigation raises questions about, and 
potentially impairs, a patent’s validity.”). See also Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. 
Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Designing around 
patents is . . . one of the ways in which the patent system works to the 
advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its 
constitutional purpose. Inherent in our claim-based patent system is also the 
principle that the protected invention is what the claims say it is, and thus 
that infringement can be avoided by avoiding the language of the claims.”); 
Century Indus., Inc. v. Wenter Corp., 851 F. Supp. 1260, 1264–65 (S.D. Ind. 
1994) (dismissing declaratory judgment claim in part because the parties were 
“still engaged in discussions aimed at resolving the potential dispute”). 
 113. Dolak, supra note 98, at 435–36. 
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jurisdictional prongs also destroys predictability114 and is 
contrary to the language of the Declaratory Judgment Act.115 
It is clear that a controversy as described in Article III can 
exist between the parties even when the conduct is not as 
immediate and certain as mandated by the Federal Circuit. In 
cases outside the patent realm, preparation to engage in the 
prohibited conduct is enough to get jurisdiction over the 
declaratory judgment action challenging the prohibition.116 A 
plaintiff challenging a criminal statute does not even have to 
show that he has prepared to commit the prohibited behavior 
before he may mount a challenge to the act.117 While there are 
certainly differences between criminal and patent cases, these 
differences affect the policy rationales behind granting 
jurisdiction, not the constitutional underpinnings of 
jurisdiction. The language of federal decisions has repeatedly 
said that plaintiffs should not have to infringe in order to get 
an adjudication of their rights.118 The necessity of meaningful 
preparation, which may frequently expose a plaintiff to an 
infringement suit, renders this protection useless. In 
Shaunnessey, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction 
prior to submission of the FDA device approval, which the court 
argued could have required changes to the device.119 As the 
plaintiffs argued, however, no potential change would have 
rendered the challenged device non-infringing.120 Therefore, 
there was a high practical likelihood that the controversy was 
real. Under Article III analysis, this is sufficient to grant 
jurisdiction.121 
                                                          
 114. Id. at 433 (“[T]o the extent that the courts inconsistently assign 
jurisdictional . . . weight to the same or similar facts in declaratory judgment 
justiciability determinations, outcomes are less predictable.”). 
 115. Id. (“[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act on its face precludes the 
consideration of prudential factors in the jurisdictional calculus, as the 
language of Congress made distinct the Act’s jurisdictional and discretionary 
aspects.”). 
 116. Hertzog, Calamari & Gleason v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 933 F. 
Supp. 246, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 117. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (allowing an immigrant 
to challenge an anti-alien land owning statute before any attempts were made 
to actually own land). 
 118. See, e.g., id. 
 119. Shaunnessey v. Monteris Med., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1324 (M.D. 
Fla. 2008). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
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D.  POLICY AND THE REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF SUIT TEST. 
While there are policy reasons to restrict declaratory 
judgment actions,122 there are also significant policy reasons to 
encourage them. The most compelling of these reasons is that 
the declaratory judgment remedy was designed to prevent 
plaintiffs from suffering significant injuries before gaining an 
adjudication of their rights.123 The traditional formulation says 
that these injuries constitute judicially awarded damages for 
infringement.124 However, an examination of the cases in which 
the courts have denied jurisdiction on the basis of the Federal 
Circuit’s test shows that declaratory judgment plaintiffs can 
often be forced to develop an infringing product to the point of 
near completion before gaining an adjudication of their rights, 
which process may ultimately find their product to be 
infringing. In this case, there is an argument to be made that 
the injury suffered constitutes the investment made between 
the period a party first asserts its right to a determination and 
the time that its product is found to be infringing. 
Lang, Duhn Oil Tool, and Shaunnessey125 demonstrate the 
costs of denying declaratory judgment in situations where 
plaintiffs may have products into which they have already put 
substantial resources, and which will require substantial 
further resources to finish. Such a decision denies the plaintiff 
the chance to (1) cease production of the infringing device and 
use the resources for another purpose, (2) design around the 
patent, or (3) evaluate the costs of getting a license before 
deciding whether to accept these costs or not as part of the 
entire cost of bringing the product to market. This wastes the 
resources needed to complete the product when an ultimately 
infringing product is completed, and the resources used to 
begin the product when an actually non-infringing product is 
                                                          
PROCEDURE § 2757 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he practical likelihood that the 
contingencies will occur and that the controversy is a real one should be 
decisive in determining whether an actual controversy exists.”). The 
imminence issue remains. However, the continuing expenditure of funds on a 
project which may turn out to be unusable should satisfy this requirement, as 
this Note argues later. 
 122. See supra note 115. 
 123. Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871, 878 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 124. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
 125. See supra notes 2334 and accompanying text for a description of 
these cases. 
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abandoned. This is not a social benefit. 
It is true that to take jurisdiction too far in the opposite 
direction would run afoul of Article III standing. As the Third 
Circuit stated, “[i]t is obvious that a person not now engaged in 
possible infringing conduct, and having no immediate intention 
of doing so, but having an academic interest in the law of 
patents, could not obtain a declaratory judgment against a 
patentee as to the validity or scope of the patent.”126 It is not 
socially desirable for a competitor to be able to challenge 
patents at will without having a financial or business interest 
in the result. However, Lang, Duhn Oil Tool, and Shaunnessey 
do not involve the problem of a gratuitous challenge to a 
competitor’s patent. In all three of the above examples, a 
significant investment had been made in the potentially 
infringing product. In Lang, a ship’s hull had been 
substantially finished.127 In Duhn Oil Tool, design had been 
completed.128 In Shaunnessey, design had been begun, and the 
product had been shown to potential customers.129 When a 
plaintiff has put a substantial investment into a product and 
finds his way blocked by the uncertain legal rights of others, he 
should not be prevented from clarifying his position by an 
overly restrictive jurisdictional doctrine. 
Another consideration weighing in favor of an easier 
declaratory judgment jurisdictional standard is what some 
claim is a proliferation of questionable patents. The FTC has 
highlighted this development as one of the more significant 
concerns surrounding the patent system.130 Patents may be 
questionable for one of two reasons: either because they are 
invalid or because they are overly broad.131 Such patents 
represent a social cost insofar as they “reduce competition in 
the covered market [because licensing fees may present an 
                                                          
 126. Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Am. Anode, Inc., 137 F.2d 68, 70 (3d Cir. 
1943). 
 127. Lang v. Pac. Marine and Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
 128. Duhn Oil Tool, Inc. v. Cooper Cameron Corp., No. 1:05-cv-01411-
OWW-GSA, 2007 WL 3335008, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2007). 
 129. Shaunessey v. Monteris Med., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1326–27 
(M.D. Fla. 2008). 
 130. Rachel Krevans & Daniel P. Munio, Restoring the Balance: The 
Supreme Court Joins the Patent Reform Movement, 9 SEDONA CONF. J. 15, 25 
(2008). 
 131. Id. at 24. 
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unreasonable barrier to entry] and [deter] follow-on innovation 
[because development of products which build on and enhance 
the technology covered by a patent will probably involve the 
covered technology itself].”132 Allowing plaintiffs to challenge 
the validity or breadth of patents more easily will provide 
another avenue for the removal of these questionable patents 
from the system.133 
This argument is bolstered by the fact that a large 
proportion of the patents challenged turn out to be invalid or 
non-infringed.134 As one commentator states: “[T]he owners of 
invalid patents can capture supracompetitive profits during the 
time before their patents are invalidated, profits made at the 
expense of consumers and that they will never have to disgorge. 
That extra profit, in turn, would create significant incentives to 
obtain and enforce dubious patents.”135 Thus, there is a 
powerful incentive to patent, even if the patent turns out to be 
weak, and such an incentive poses a social cost. Allowing a 
plaintiff to easily challenge patents before the patents hinder 
the plaintiff’s work significantly reduces this cost. 
E.  A REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE. 
How should courts decide when to grant declaratory 
judgment in these cases? Any alternative standard will, of 
course, still have to respect the basic tenets of Article III 
standing, which require an actual case or controversy.136 A 
standard which minimizes lost investment in ultimately 
                                                          
 132. Id. 
 133. Krevans & Munio mention the possibility that MedImmune will have 
the following effect: 
[T]he Court’s decision in MedImmune may also help to reduce the 
volume of questionable patents in effect. MedImmune clears the way, 
on a jurisdictional level, for use of the “pay and sue” strategy by 
licensees. Under this approach, a licensee eliminates the risk of being 
sued for infringement by paying royalties under the license, while 
simultaneously attacking the underlying patent’s validity.  . . . 
MedImmune makes it easier for interested parties to challenge 
questionable patents. Removing such patents from circulation, if 
indeed they are invalid, benefits the industry to which they pertain 
and the economy at large. 
Id. at 28. 
 134. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV 19, 27 
(2008). 
 135. Id. at 28. 
 136. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
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infringing products, however, can still accomplish this. Instead 
of requiring the heretofore narrowly defined “immediacy” and 
“reality” test, courts should simply look at whether all the 
circumstances indicate that the declaratory judgment plaintiff 
has made a prima facie showing that he intends to produce a 
product which may be accused of infringement by the 
declaratory judgment defendant. Such an approach will allow 
courts to determine when a party has expended sufficient 
resources in the development of the product to render the 
dispute non-hypothetical. Also, it will not shut the courthouse 
door to plaintiffs who are being forced to choose between 
“pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that which 
[they claim] a right to do.”137 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The second prong of the Federal Circuit’s reasonable 
apprehension of suit test suffered from unreasonable 
formalism, an overly restrictive view of Article III standing, 
and a conflation of jurisdictional and discretionary analyses. 
This led to undesirable effects, and plaintiffs were precluded 
from litigating their rights before making a substantial 
investment in questionable products. In addition, the difficulty 
of getting into court to litigate potentially invalid patents led to 
an incentive to apply for and enforce these patents. After the 
MedImmune decision, there is reason to hope that the Federal 
Circuit will lower this standard. 
If this occurs, it will have the effect of bringing cases into 
the system sooner, and may increase the number of patent 
cases adjudicated by federal courts. It may also provide a less 
clear guide concerning whether an actual case or controversy is 
presented. In the vast majority of circumstances, however, the 
fact that a party will shortly be offering for sale a product that 
may infringe another’s patent will more than satisfy the 
standing criteria. Courts should easily be able to spot those 
that do not. The end result will be fairer and will strengthen, 
not weaken, the patent system. 
 
 
                                                          
 137. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
